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Relationship of Auditing Standards
To Detection of Fraud
George R. Catlett
A r t h u r Andersen & C o .
The accounting profession is facing a wide diversity of difficult challenges.
One of the current problems facing C P A s i n public practice is how to achieve a
proper understanding on the part of the public and others of 1) the relationship of auditing standards to the detection of fraud, and 2) the responsibilities
of auditors for the detection of fraud.
Nature of F r a u d
Dishonesty and deceit have always been present to some degree not only
i n the business community but i n all walks of life. However, fraud i n business
enterprises has been increasing i n recent years. W h i l e most managements and
employees are honest, there are enough material cases of dishonesty to cause
concern among independent auditors.
Fifteen years ago, most accounting firms had only an occasional fraud case,
and many of those were not of any great significance. Today, w i t h fraud cases
becoming more common, and w i t h investigations by governmental agencies and
resulting litigation exploding i n all directions, this disturbing trend is becoming
a major factor i n the operation of accounting firms. Some of the reasons for
this situation are interesting, but time limitations do not permit us to discuss
that topic.
W h a t constitutes fraud is not always clear. In cases of bankruptcies and
failures, fraud is sometimes alleged when what really may have occurred was
bad management decisions and/or adverse business conditions, with a resulting
loss of money by investors and creditors. T h e tendency to allege " f r a u d " under
these circumstances frequently seems to be irresistible. In any event, what is
referred to as " f r a u d " i n some cases may not actually be " f r a u d . "
Legal liability of independent auditors for alleged negligence and other
deficiencies i n their work has many ramifications. M r . A . A . Sommer, Jr., now
a Commissioner of the S E C , discussed this area at the Symposium here i n 1972.
The number of court cases involving the question of whether and under what
circumstances an auditor may have legal liability is still somewhat limited; but
more such cases w i l l probably go to trial i n the next few years, and the guidelines may become clearer than they are at the present time.
M a n y different kinds and magnitudes of fraud exist, w i t h some not affecting
the financial statements at all or only i n a minor way, while others have a
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material effect on the financial statements.
of fraud are:

Some examples of the various types

1. Misappropriation of assets.
2. Overstatement of assets or understatement of liabilities to present
more favorable financial position and/or results of operations.
3. Siphoning off of assets through transactions w i t h affiliated entities
or i n other ways.
4. " K i c k b a c k s " and other irregular transactions between officers or
employees of an enterprise and outside parties.
5. L a c k of disclosure of significant information.
Fraud i n a business entity may be covered up i n many ways, but major
cases usually include collusion among officers and/or employees, or collusion
w i t h outside persons. T h e cover-up may involve false accounting entries or misleading information, forgeries, unrecorded transactions, or other such means.
Responsibilities of Management
Management has the primary responsiblity for the use and safeguarding
of corporate assets and the incurrence of liabilities of the business enterprise on
behalf of the stockholders. A n additional responsibility runs to creditors and
other parties and agencies w i t h a legitimate interest i n the enterprise.
T h e responsibilities of the board of directors i n monitoring the management
are becoming of increasing concern to many directors, particularly the outside
directors. Even though the directors, as representatives of the stockholders,
review or approve management actions i n various ways, the responsibilities of
directors for various kinds of management fraud are still somewhat undefined
from a legal standpoint.
One of the important functions of management is the establishment of an
adequate accounting system along w i t h appropriate administrative and internal
accounting controls and the necessary internal auditing. T h e resulting financial
statements are the direct representations of management, setting forth the financial position and results of operations of the enterprise along with the necessary
disclosures for interpretation of the financial statements.
Primary reliance for the prevention and detection of fraud should be placed
on an adequate system of internal control because such a system is i n constant
operation and covers a great many periods and transactions when the independent auditor is not present. It is not feasible for the auditor to check these
transactions later i n any detail. Management should realize that a good system
of internal control can be circumvented by collusion among employees or by
collusion between one or more employees and persons outside the enterprise.
This possibility must be considered by management, and internal auditing is an
additional safeguard.
W h e n collusion to circumvent the accounting system is directed by management, an additional and complicating dimension is added to the problem
of deciding when and h o w an auditor might detect fraud, assuming that generally accepted auditing standards have been followed.
Managements involved i n some fraud cases have been held legally responsible from a civil and/or criminal standpoint. However, the number of cases is
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disturbing i n which the independent auditor appears to be the main "target" i n
governmental investigations and class action suits rather than the individuals
who perpetrated the fraud.
Present Auditing Standards
W h a t effect, i f any, should recent fraud cases and the resulting governmental
investigations and litigation have o n auditing standards? A r e the present standards satisfactory? Have w e learned as m u c h as we should have from our
experiences? Have the fraud situations gone undetected by auditors because of
ineffective work or inadequate auditing standards; or has the cause been
fraudulent concealment by management or other actions not detectable by normally appropriate auditing procedures? T h e answers to these and many other
related questions are not self-evident.
The auditor should constantly exercise his professional judgment i n deciding
whether it is reasonable to assume that he has a l l the pertinent facts and what
auditing standards and procedures are necessary i n attempting to obtain the
facts. A u d i t i n g cannot be done entirely by rules and forms.
T h e greater use of electronic computers and a l l sorts of sophisticated equipment for accounting and related purposes also represents new challenges i n
developing audit techniques. Some of the basic concepts of auditing may be
changed. However, the standards of auditing should not be thwarted by
equipment. People, not machines, commit fraud.
T h e A I C P A has a special committee reviewing the E q u i t y F u n d i n g case
to determine whether i n the light of that case consideration should be given by
the A I C P A to possible changes i n any auditing standards and procedures. T h e
report of that committee has not been issued.
T h e most authoritative statement by the A I C P A of the independent auditor's responsibility for the detection of fraud is set forth i n Statement on A u d i t i n g
Standards N o . 1 (paragraphs 110.05-110.08), and this is quoted i n Appendix A .
Chapter 6, " D u e A u d i t Care," from The Philosophy of Auditing by M a u t z
and Sharaf, contains this statement: "Independent auditors should accept responsibility for the discovery and disclosure of those irregularities which the
exercise of due audit care by a prudent practitioner w o u l d normally uncover."
A summary of some of the views expressed i n that chapter is quoted i n A p pendix B .
The membership of the A I C P A adopted ten standards that are referred to
as "generally accepted auditing standards," and these are classified as general
standards, standards of field work, and standards of reporting. These standards
contain such requirements as technical training and proficiency, independence,
due professional care, adequate planning, proper study and evaluation of internal
control, and sufficient competent evidential matter. Careful distinction should
be drawn between these "auditing standards" and the "auditing procedures" to
be selected and executed i n accordance with the standards.
A l l of the items referred to above are well written and pertinent to the
subject under discussion. W h e n we relate what is said i n those documents to
the situation i n which the accounting profession finds itself today, it is evident
that controversial questions and misunderstandings exist.
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Internal Control
Internal control, for many reasons, has become an increasingly important
factor i n the conduct of audits. T h e A I C P A second standard of field work
states: "There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the existing internal
control as a basis for reliance thereon and for the determination of the resultant
extent of the tests to which auditing procedures are to be restricted."
The evolution i n auditing over many years i n the direction of greater reliance
on internal controls and the use of test-checking i n reviewing those controls is
not just a theoretical or philosophical development. T h i s trend is the result of
practical necessity. W i t h the large business enterprises that n o w exist, detailed
auditing to any significant extent is not economically feasible.
W h e n there are millions of transactions i n a single enterprise i n a year, an
auditor must rely on test-checks for much of his work. Therefore, the effectiveness of the accounting system and internal controls and the integrity of management are crucial to the auditor.
Most of the significant fraud cases publicized i n the financial press are the
result of a breakdown i n internal control as a result of management direction,
collusion of officers and/or employees, deterioration of internal control from
neglect, or a combination of these and similar factors.
T h e auditor's evaluation of internal control is an important phase of an
audit engagement. Management has a responsibility to its shareholders to see
that adequate internal control exists. A n absence of adequate control raises a
serious question; one to which professional judgment must be applied as to
whether the auditor can compensate by expanding the scope of his w o r k or
should withdraw from the engagement.
Representations by Clients
Representations by management and employees take many forms i n the
conduct of an audit. If an auditor is precluded from relying on such representations and should be required to assume that all of them are wrong until he can
prove them correct, an audit w o u l d have to be viewed from a vastly different
perspective. A n auditor certainly does not accept all information and data
given to h i m by a client without question. O n the other hand, when an auditor
is given misinformation or information is withheld without his knowledge,
there are limits to the steps he should be expected to take to find something he
does not know exists. If each audit is to be approached w i t h the viewpoint that
the client is dishonest until proven otherwise, not only would an entirely new
approach be needed but also the auditor may well be placed i n an untenable
position.
T h e credibility and integrity of management are an important factor for
an auditor to assess i n the conduct of his work. If the auditor finds that a management does not have sufficient integrity to rely on its representations, he is
running a serious risk that frequently cannot adequately be dealt with by a n
extension or expansion of the audit procedures. O n the other hand, an auditor
may assume that integrity exists and then find to his dismay that his trust and
confidence i n this regard were misplaced.
Auditors do have responsibilities i n the conduct of an audit, but these
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responsibilities do not include infallibility or clairvoyance. Management should
be held responsible for misrepresentations and withholding of material matters
from the auditor. A n auditor should not be held responsible when he follows
customary auditing procedures, those procedures do not disclose the deception,
and no apparent reason exists to expand the customary audit procedures.
What are Some of the Pertinent Questions?
A few pertinent questions regarding auditing standards and procedures
as they relate to the detection of fraud are set forth below i n order to serve as a
basis for discussion.
The first question is: Should an unqualified auditor's opinion be construed
to constitute a representation that there is no undetected fraud having a material
effect on the financial statements?
A second and somewhat related question is: Should an auditor be held to
be a "guarantor" of the financial statements or of the fairness with which they
are presented insofar as fraud is concerned? Put another way, should the auditor
be held to have a joint responsibility w i t h the management for the financial
statements i n this regard?
The third question is: C a n fraud become so extensive or massive that the
answers to the first two questions are different?
A fourth question, especially i f the first two are answered affirmatively, is:
Are any basic changes needed i n current auditing standards and procedures?
A fifth question is: Should auditors rate clients as to quality and take only
the better ones? If so, what are the criteria for this purpose?
A further question is: Should legislation be passed establishing greater
responsibility on the part of everyone not to intentially mislead auditors?
I w i l l not try as a part of my formal remarks to answer these questions i n
detail, but I w i l l make a few comments on them.
Hindsight is a wonderful faculty. There is no area i n which hindsight is
more readily applied than to undetected fraud after such fraud is later discovered.
It inevitably seems to appear obvious that the fraud should have been detected.
The circumstances at the time are most difficult to recreate and comprehend, and
little effort is really made to do so. Second-guessing becomes prevalent, and
the less experience or knowledge one has about auditing, the more certain one
becomes of the righteousness of his condemnation. Subsequently judging the
effectiveness of a professional person i n doing his w o r k under the stress and
strain and actual conditions at the time should not be taken lightly.
Auditors should not be presumed to have represented or guaranteed that
no undetected fraud exists or to have guaranteed that the financial statements
are a fair presentation of the financial position and results of operations. Those
who suggest that the auditor has a joint, and presumably equal, responsibility
with management for the financial statements do not i n my view understand
the relative roles of management and the auditor. There is no more justification
for an auditor to be a guarantor than there would be for a lawyer to guarantee
that he w i l l w i n a lawsuit or a doctor to guarantee that an operation w i l l be
successful. A lawyer does not have a joint responsibility for a client's morals,
and a doctor does not have a joint responsibility for a patient's health habits.
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Insofar as the extent or massiveness of a fraud is concerned, about all to be
said about this is that the larger the fraud the more likely it is to be detected
by the auditor i n following proper audit procedures. However, counter forces
to detection may be the extent of the collusion inside and outside of the enterprise, the existence of expert forgery, or other sophisticated deterrents to detection.
Generally accepted auditing standards and procedures should be constantly
reevaluated i n the light of improved knowledge and current developments. T h i s
should be done by the accounting profession and by accounting firms. A s an
example, some of our past ideas i n this regard may be changed by computers.
Some improvements can undoubtedly be made i n auditing techniques and procedures, but I see no particular evidence that any revolutionary change is needed
in the standards.
O u r free-enterprise system w i l l be hampered and the tradition of opportunity
for all w i l l be affected, i f the accounting firms decide only to perform audit
services for "safe" clients. A relatively new enterprise w i t h a first-time registration statement is frequently of greater risk for an auditor than an established
business. T h e new enterprise is more likely to result i n failure or disillusioned
investors. However, the public interest may not best be served if auditors are
forced to avoid such risks. T h e auditor should be able to perform a professional
service for these entitles i n a proper manner without being subjected to the
threat of a lawsuit whenever one of them fails.
As to whether legislation is desirable w i t h respect to putting greater penalties
on misleading the duly appointed auditors of a company, many factors are
involved. I would not advocate such legislation at this time, but something
needs to be done to protect the auditor, who all too frequently is left "holding
the bag" as a result of management misconduct.
Auditors are well aware that fraud can occur. They are also concerned
about the possibility of fraud being so material as to have a significant effect
on the financial statements upon which they are reporting. O n the other hand,
the accounting profession must not permit itself to be destroyed by assuming
responsibilities or accepting a role that cannot be successfully fulfilled.
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Appendix A
Extract from Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1,
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (1973)
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Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent A u d i t o r

Detection of F r a u d
.05
In m a k i n g the ordinary examination, the independent auditor is aware
of the possibility that fraud may exist. Financial statements may be misstated
as the result of defalcations and similar irregularities, or deliberate misrepresentation by management, or both. T h e auditor recognizes that fraud, if sufficiently
material, may affect his opinion on the financial statements, and his examination, made i n accordance w i t h generally accepted auditing standards, gives consideration to this possibility. However, the ordinary examination directed to the
expression of an opinion on financial statements is not primarily or specifically
designed, and cannot be relied upon, to disclose defalcations and other similar
irregularities, although their discovery may result. Similarly, although the
discovery of deliberate misrepresentation by management is usually more closely
associated w i t h the objective of the ordinary examination, such examination
cannot be relied upon to assure its discovery. T h e responsibility of the independent auditor for failure to detect fraud (which responsibility differs as to
clients and others) arises only when such failure clearly results from failure to
comply with generally accepted auditing standards.
.06
Reliance for the prevention and detection of fraud should be placed
principally upon an adequate accounting system with appropriate internal control. T h e well-established practice of the independent auditor of evaluating the
adequacy and effectiveness of the system of internal control by testing the
accounting records and related data and by relying on such evaluation for the
selection and t i m i n g of his other auditing procedures has generally proved
sufficient for making an adequate examination. If an objective of an independent
auditor's examination were the discovery of all fraud, he would have to extend
his work to a point where its cost would be prohibitive. E v e n then he could
not give assurance that all types of fraud had been detected, or that none existed,
because items such as unrecorded transactions, forgeries, and collusive fraud
would not necessarily be uncovered. Acordingly, it is generally recognized that
good internal control and fidelity bonds provide protection more economically
and effectively. In the case of fidelity bonds, protection is afforded not only by
the indemnification for discovered defalcations but also by the possible deterrent
effect upon employees; the presence of fidelity bonds, however, should not affect
the scope of the auditor's examination.
.07
W h e n an independent auditor's examination leading to an opinion on
financial statements discloses specific circumstances that make h i m suspect that
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fraud may exist, he should decide whether the fraud, if i n fact it should exist,
might be of such magnitude as to affect his opinion on the financial statements.
If the independent auditor believes that fraud so material as to affect his opinion
may have occurred, he should reach an understanding w i t h the proper representatives of the client as to whether the auditor or the client, subject to the
auditor's review, is to make the investigation necessary to determine whether
fraud has i n fact occurred, and, i f so, the amount thereof. If, on the other hand,
the independent auditor concludes that any such fraud could not be so material
as to affect his opinion, he should refer the matter to the proper representatives
of the client w i t h the recommendation that it be pursued to a conclusion. F o r
example, frauds involving " l a p p i n g " accounts receivable collections, or frauds
involving overstatements of inventory, could be material, while those involving
peculations from a small imprest fund w o u l d normally be of little significance
because the operation and size of the fund tend to establish a limitation.
.08
The subsequent discovery that fraud existed during the period covered
by the independent auditor's examination does not of itself indicate negligence
on his part. H e is not an insurer or guarantor; i f his examination was made w i t h
due professional skill and care i n accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards, he has fulfilled all of the obligations implicit i n his undertaking.
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Appendix B
Extract from R . K . Mautz and Hussein A . Sharaf,
The Philosophy of Auditing, American Accounting Association, 1961
Chapter 6—Due Audit Care, pp. 139-140
Summary. I n this chapter we have tried to establish a concept of due audit
care as the basis for judging the responsibility of independent auditors i n the
performance of their professional duties. T h i s concept is based on an assumed
prudent practitioner and the knowledge, skill, caution, and responsiveness that
could be expected from h i m under the circumstances at issue. T h e usefulness
of such a concept seems clear. If i t can be developed, it w i l l give to all concerned
with the subject a more explicit statement than is now available i n the literature.
The difficulty of formulating such a concept is closely related to the problem
of irregularity detection. There are some irregularities which should be discovered
in any standard examination; the obligation of discovering certain other irregularities would be so onerous a burden as to be unbearable. Between these extremes are perhaps innumerable cases varying from one extreme to the other.
W e are unable to find i n the characteristics of irregularities themselves any
significant clues which permit a precise statement of audit responsibility for
detection. T h i s leads us naturally and inevitably to consideration of the legal
doctrine of a prudent man and its application to auditing.
It must be recognized that a concept of due audit care, founded on the
legal concept of a prudent m a n acting reasonably w i t h average knowledge and
average judgment i n the specific circumstances, cannot give us objective advance
answers to the question of responsibility i n any given case. W e feel it does give
a useful criterion to the auditor himself and to those who must judge the quality
of his work, a criterion which w i l l increase i n usefulness as experience sharpens
and strengthens the concept itself.
W e also believe that a statement indicating the extent of responsibility
accepted can be formulated i n a manner that w i l l make its usefulness apparent,
both to practitioners i n their daily affairs and to the profession as an indication
of acceptance of its just and fair responsibilities. L i k e development of the concept
of due audit care, this may take some time, but it is a worthy endeavor and w i l l
repay the effort. A s a beginning, we suggest the following summary. It w i l l be
apparent to the careful reader that its component ideas have been borrowed from
a variety of sources.
Independent auditors should accept responsibility for the discovery and
disclosure of those irregularities which the exercise of due audit care by a
prudent practitioner would normally uncover. A prudent practitioner is assumed
to have a knowledge of the philosophy and practice of auditing, to have the
degree of training, experience, and skill common to the average independent
auditor, to have the ability to recognize indications or irregularities, and to keep
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abreast of developments i n the perpetration and detection of irregularities. Due
audit care requires the auditor to acquaint himself w i t h the company under
examination, its method of operation and any significant practices peculiar to it
or the industry of which it is a part, to review the method of internal control
operating i n the company under examination by inquiry and such other methods
as are desirable, to obtain any knowledge readily available w h i c h is pertinent
to the accounting and financial problems of the company under examination,
to be responsive to unusual events and unfamiliar circumstances, to persist until
he has eliminated from his o w n m i n d any reasonable doubts he may have about
the existence of material irregularities, and to exercise caution i n instructing his
assistants and reviewing their w o r k .
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